The roots of America's Middle East decline

Since the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, I have received questions from a number of journalists, both American and Arab. They have asked what the US withdrawal means for the region, for American leadership in the world and which countries will now fill the void left by the absence of the US from the scene. I have no doubt that these questions have been prompted, in no small measure, by the messiness of the withdrawal, the nightmarish and chaotic scenes at the airport, the tragic human stories of those left behind and the speed with which the American-friendly government collapsed followed by the Taliban’s takeover of the country. 

That said, in each instance I have cautioned those who asked these questions to take note of the fact that America’s problems in the greater Middle East did not begin with the withdrawal. Our decline began twenty years earlier with the reckless, costly and disastrous decisions of the Bush administration to invade both Afghanistan and Iraq followed by the decision to occupy them and attempt to create “democracies” that would support our interests.

These wars were reckless because in both instances the Bush administration was advised by experts in the intelligence community and career-level State Department and military officials that these were not wars we could win or governments we could fashion to our liking. In both cases, Bush, ignored those who knew Afghanistan and Iraq and listened instead to influential neoconservatives who had become the dominant force in his cabinet. Because these ideologues did not know the culture, makeup, or histories of either country, they allowed ideology to trump reality. As a result, these efforts were, from the outset, doomed to failure.

Both wars were also costly in lives and treasure for the United States, Afghanistan and Iraq. The Iraqi and Afghani losses were incalculable and devastating. In the US case, we lost more than 6,000 troops, with tens of thousands more left physically and/or mentally maimed for life. It’s also important to note that in each year since the end of active combat in both Afghanistan and Iraq, we’ve lost more than 6,000 more US veterans to suicide, an average of 20+ per day! In addition, there are tens of thousands more who’ve joined the ranks of the homeless and those addicted to drugs, all the result of war-induced trauma. The morale of the military has been affected. These two wars and the treatment of veterans, those maimed, affected by PTSD, and addicted, has so far cost us more than 3 trillion dollars.

And these wars were disastrous because they accomplished none of their goals. Extremism was not defeated. Instead, it has metastasised into more lethal forms and spread to many more countries threatening the security and stability of countries across the greater Middle East and North Africa and even taking root in some European countries as well. Another disastrous byproduct of these wars is the fact that Iran has now been unleashed on the region and become emboldened to meddle into the affairs of others. The prestige of the US has been weakened. And while the goal of the neoconservatives was to decisively win these wars, demonstrating American power and resolve, thereby ensuring a century of US hegemony in a unipolar world, instead we now see the emergence of a multipolar world with regional and other global powers playing out their strategic ambitions in country after country across the Middle East.

So, whether we stayed in Afghanistan or not, a new reality has already taken hold across the Middle East. Other powers are already either replacing us or competing with us for influence, and some key regional allies, wearied by our blunders and miscalculations, are pursuing their own interests independent of ours. As a result, our leverage is more limited than it was. That said, the US cannot be written off as a “has been” power. We still have influence in the Middle East, economic, military and cultural. We remain the world’s most successful economy, we still have significant deterrent capabilities that can defend allies, and our too often underestimated “soft power” remains our most important asset.

As disastrous as the US departure may have been, we had no option but to limit our loses and leave Afghanistan and end our active combat role in Iraq. But making these decisions in no ways means we are abandoning the region. It simply means that we recognised the realities neoconservatives tragically  ignored. What is needed now is a clearheaded examination of the damage done by both wars and a recalibration of our regional posture that realistically matches our needs with our capacities so that we can best protect our interests and those of our allies.

The writer is president of the Washington-based Arab American Institute