A war worth fighting, but ‘we are not there yet’

It appears that we may be going to war against the Islamic State (IS).

I use the word “appears” advisedly, because appearances may be deceiving.

It is true that we have already bombed almost 200 IS targets. And it is true that President Barack Obama declared his intention to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the IS, with Vice-President Joe Biden upping the rhetorical ante, promising to “follow them to the gates of hell”.

It is also true that Congress has now appropriated significant sums to train and arm a select group of Syrian opposition fighters. But even with all this, there are still too many pieces of this puzzle that do not fit, or are missing, to be able to say what we are doing or where it will go.

I am not one of those who scoffed at the president, a few weeks ago, when he told reporters that he had not yet developed a strategy to confront ISIL — another name of IS.

Despite the rants of critics on the right — some of who think that a good strategy consists of bombing first and asking questions later — I want my president to spend time developing a strategy. 

Neither do I agree with those same hawks who argue that if only we had not left Iraq or if only we had taken military action in Syria sooner, ISIL would not have been the menace it is today.

These critics forget that we left Iraq because the Bush administration had negotiated an agreement with the Iraqi government that would have put US forces that remained in the country after 2011 at great risk.

After more than seven years of occupation, Iraqis wanted us to leave.

Those critics also ignore the simple fact that any US engagement early in the Syrian conflict would not have doused the flames of the conflict as much as it would have added additional fuel to the Syrian fires.

Increased American arms to the opposition would have resulted in increased Iranian and Russian support for their ally. Direct US engagement would have created an even greater incentive for extremists to come to Syria. And, in any case, the president understood that in the process of winding down two failed wars, the American people had little tolerance for getting into a new one.

What is different today is that the grotesque behaviour of IS, coupled with its rapid advances on the ground, has created a sense of urgency and outrage, provoking demands for an American response.

And so the president has responded with: some initial steps designed to stop IS’ advance; an intensified effort to mobilise an international coalition of partners willing to join the campaign against IS; the development of a strategy that will be able to accomplish the objective of degrading and destroying IS.

The painstaking work needed to build a coalition is the first order of business. But putting together the pieces that will be required to accomplish this mission will not be easy.

Most of our NATO allies share outrage over IS’ behaviour, but too many remain gun shy.

Turkey, which shares borders with both Syria and Iraq, has been an enabler of some of the violent extremist groups now allied with the IS.

It may feel threatened by the dangers posed by this now out-of-control creature it helped nurture, but it has given no indication that it is ready to take military action to confront it.

Arab allies are conflicted. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been the most forthcoming in offering support to the coalition — but they have also asked important questions about strategy and have wanted assurances about the commitment of others to join the effort.

What about the strategy?

IS has fed off of the deep grievances of Sunni Arabs in both Iraq and Syria. In the former they are a disenfranchised minority, in the latter a disenfranchised majority.

In Iraq, one key component of the effort to defeat IS must include reforming the system of governance to provide for full Sunni partnership.

The first step involved removing former prime minister Nouri Al Maliki, who had tormented Sunni Arabs while recklessly pursuing a sectarian agenda.

His successor has been inclined to create a more inclusive government, but efforts to date have been less than satisfactory. Key ministries have gone to sectarian figures and the main Iraqi armed forces fighting the IS remain Shiite militias, many of whom maintain strong ties with Iran.

Compounding this problem is the fact that the other main armed force waging war against IS is the Kurdish peshmerga — who many Iraqi Arabs fear harbours separatist ambitions.

Given this unsettled state of affairs, many Sunni Arab states will be cautious about the extent of their involvement if they fear that the result will be to consolidate Iran’s hold over Iraq.

Despite IS’ barbaric actions, these Arab states understand that if Sunni grievances have fuelled that movement, bombing Sunnis in order to allow Shiite militias to take over will only fan the flames of sectarian hostility — with the potential of making a bad situation even worse.

If finding a strategy is difficult for Iraq, Syria presents an even more complicated situation.

The outrage that fuelled the IS movement was the relentless brutality of Syrian government and its refusal to consider serious internal reforms.

The external political coalition that represents the Syrian opposition to the regime is diverse and includes several thoughtful visionary leaders. But there are concerns that this external leadership’s ties to the armed elements on the ground in Syria are less than organic.

The groups engaged in the fight against the regime are remarkably fragmented, with many now espousing some form of extremist religious ideology. They fight the regime and each other.

While some of these groups have been bitterly opposed to IS, there are indications that they may not support a US-led effort to oust the IS if they feel that the beneficiary will be the regime.

Facing this complexity and the obvious dangers involved, there are many who are opposed to any US action. But given IS’ terrorist actions against all who oppose their rule, their genocidal campaigns against minorities in areas they have subdued, and the existential threat they pose to the entire region, doing nothing is as unacceptable as the hawk’s inclination to just do anything. 

Finding the right course of action will require leadership, discipline, a long-term commitment and thoughtful diplomacy.

That is why I say it appears we may be going to war. This is one that is worth fighting, but we are not there yet.