Austria’s far right did not win

VIENNA – Commentators have been unanimous in describing Sunday’s legislative election in Austria as a victory for the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ), and pressure is now mounting on the progressive president, Alexander van der Bellen, to give the populists a chance to form a government. But this narrative misconstrues the electoral outcome and risks handing anti-democratic forces an unearned windfall.

To be sure, the FPÖ had a strong showing, winning more than 1.3 million votes (29.2 per cent). But this is not unprecedented. In four of the last five elections, far-right parties attracted more than a million supporters, reflecting the fact that a significant minority of mostly rural Austrians (representing roughly one-quarter of the electorate) has consistently supported uber-conservative political projects. Austria’s constitutional system, with its considerable regional decentralisation, has always been able to manage this unfortunate reality.

The narrative of a far-right “victory” seems to rest on the fact that the FPÖ won a plurality of votes among the five factions that gained seats in the National Assembly. In Vienna, the capital and the most populous state of Austria’s nine states, the Social Democrats won decisively, increasing their share of the vote. And, nationally, the Christian Democratic Austrian People’s Party finished second, with 26.5 per cent of the popular vote. Nonetheless, supporters of the far right in Austria have seized on global headlines to claim that any outcome other than a cabinet headed by the FPÖ’s pro-Russian leader, Herbert Kickl, would amount to a betrayal of democratic values.

This is not the first time we have heard such arguments following a plurality victory within a proportional multiparty system. Last year, Poland’s right-wing president spent weeks delaying the transfer of power from the populist Law and Justice (PiS) party to the democratic opposition based on an analogous rationale. And soon thereafter, commentators raised alarms about the supposed populist mandate in the Netherlands, where Geert Wilders’s far-right Party for Freedom became the largest of the 15 parliamentary factions, winning 23.5 per cent of the popular vote.

In none of these countries do constitutional provisions require entrusting a plurality winner with the task of forming the government. Such a rule would be absurd. Far from magically conferring a popular mandate, winning a plurality is mainly a function of how fragmented a country’s political party system is.

In this Austrian election, for example, 9.1 per cent of the vote went to the New Austria and Liberal Forum (NEOS), which gained two additional seats in the Assembly. Formed in 2012, NEOS wants to revitalise the economy and strengthen support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression. Had it not been around, the People’s Party probably would have overtaken the FPÖ in the elusive quest for a plurality.

Given this, should we then conclude that the preference of more than 400,000 Austrians for a more energetic liberal formation somehow hands the mandate to govern to the far right? What about the nearly one million Austrians who voted for the Social Democrats? Under the plurality-mandate theory, they also supported the far-right “mandate” by not holding their noses and strategically voting for the center right.

In the face of a consistent populist threat, democratic forces should not just roll over. They should innovate. Sometimes, the result will not be a unified “republican front,” but rather a loose assemblage of democratic factions that appeal to various segments of the electorate.

This is what happened last year in Poland. The authoritarian PiS was defeated by leftist, liberal, and Christian Democratic blocs that coordinated mutually friendly campaigns and, after belatedly receiving the presidential commission, smoothly formed a cabinet. The baseless fixation on a plurality mandate discourages such successful democratic experiments by ignoring the legitimacy of other parties’ shares of support.

The typical response to such arguments is rooted in tradition. In Austria, the party with the strongest showing has almost always been offered an opportunity to form the government and hold the federal chancellorship. But the populists are themselves providing reasons to be treated differently. From Poland and the Netherlands to Austria, populists consistently frame elections as a stark choice between an indistinguishable assortment of corrupt mainstream parties and themselves. In one of the FPÖ’s pre-election ads, a stern-looking voter stands at a crossroads with a rightward-pointing sign featuring Kickl and a leftward-pointing sign lumping together photos of the four mainstream party leaders.

Van der Bellen should take the populist message seriously and decline to offer Kickl a chance to form the government. If the FPÖ truly represents a vision of Austria distinct from that of all other parties, then voters have made their wishes clear. The FPÖ’s vision was overwhelmingly rejected. Despite significant economic and social challenges, 70 per cent of Austrians chose to entrust their country’s governance to mainstream democratic parties. Their voices should be heard.

Maciej Kisilowski is Associate Professor of Law and Strategy at Central European University in Vienna. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2024. www.project-syndicate.org