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The trajectory of the next funding tranche for Jordan : Where is Jordan heading?
Dec 29,2024 - Last updated at Dec 29,2024
The outbreak of the Syrian conflict triggered one of the largest displacement crises in modern history, forcing millions of Syrians to flee their homes in search of safety.
Neighbouring countries became the primary destinations for refugees, each bearing the weight of the crisis in unique ways.
While Turkey became home to the largest number of Syrian refugees, and Lebanon struggled under the strain of its own socio-economic challenges, Jordan emerged as a significant host country, receiving a substantial share of the displaced population reaching approximately 1.3 million Syrian refugees.1
When I first entered the world of development, the Syrian crisis dominated every conversation, and the influx of crowdfunding—by state actors and NGOs alike—was at its peak.
Back then, the idea of a “Syrian refugee budget” as a normalized, recurring allocation didn’t yet exist.
The crisis was fresh, raw, and immediate. Funding poured in, though gaps soon became evident and the funding that was received over the years never met the actual requirements outlined by the government of Jordan.
For example, in 2017 the government funding requirements stood at $2.65 billion, however only $1.779 billion—or 67.1 per cent—had been secured by the end of 2016.
Fast forward to 2023, the funding deficit for the Jordan Response Plan had reached $1.9 billion by August, with only $376 million received.
We see that over the course of the last 10 years the funding requirements have remained relatively steady at around $2 billion, with the noticeable shift in donor allocations, which have steadily dwindled, forcing Jordan to do more with less.
This trend of diminishing donor support raises pressing questions about the future.
As Jordan grapples with the long-term impact of hosting a significant refugee population, new geopolitical developments, such as the ousting of Assad’s regime and Syria’s return to relative safety, are poised to reshape the funding landscape.
The 2024 Jordan Response Plan, crafted before such changes became apparent, illustrates how Jordan’s funding priorities have evolved to balance immediate refugee needs — with long-term resilience efforts.
Yet, with the changing political realities, one must ask: will the funds once allocated to Syrians now be redirected elsewhere? What ripple effects will this have on Jordan’s already overstretched treasury? And what of the infrastructure — schools, clinics, and shelters — that has been painstakingly developed over the last decade to accommodate this reality? Will it stand as a reminder of a crisis overcome, or become a relic of mismanaged priorities in a shifting political landscape? As Jordan enters this uncertain chapter, these questions require answers.
Ultimately, how aid priorities evolve will depend on donor agendas, Jordan’s political and economic strategy, and the pace of refugee returns and reintegration.
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